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Introduction
Thank you for attending! (Who is this guy?)
What are we going to talk about?
Industrial Automation Equipment
PLCs
OITs
DCS
SCADA
Sensors
Telemetry
Custom Hardware (often PLC Derived)
DHS's ICS Security Class
What it is
How to attend
How to prepare
What to bring
What to expect
Securing Controls System Networks
History of PLC Security
History of penetration software and crackers/attackers
Where we stand today
What do we do to respond?
Part One:  Intro to Industrial Controls
Why should we care?
Pervasiveness of this equipment
It's used in all areas of manufacturing
It's used in all large buildings
It's increasingly networked
It's uniformly vulnerable
Programmers rarely know or care
Vulnerabilities are rarely fixed
Software and Firmare are rarely updated
Usefulness of this equipment
Save development time
Stop reinventing the wheel
Extreme reliability
Extreme servicability
Future-proofing
Increasing capability footprint
More and more things can be done with PLCs
More and more things will be done with PLCs
If we don't start paying attention, more vulnerabilites
  will enter our areas of control.
Increasing potential for damage from intrusion
The more these devices are used and networked, the more
  the chance that an intrusion will result in serious
  physical damage.
What's so special about this equipment?
Reliability
Maintainability
Designer Efficiency
Bridge to Custom Hardware
Familiarity
Transferrability
Hardware Introduction - Show and Tell:
PLC
Brick
Rack
Rackless
Integrated
OIT
Membrane Keys
Touch Screen
Tell:
DCS
SCADA
Sensors
Telemetry
Custom Hardware (often PLC Derived)
Common themes in the hardware
Direct connection of devices
Optical Isolation, even when there are Mechanical Relays
Full-Voltage Analog Devices
RTD, Thermocouple, and Millivolt Analog
Communications to Displays, 3rd Party Devices
What's so special?
Slow, reliable processors
Ruggedized Hardware
Background OS layer Creates A Virtual Machine
Harvard Architecture
Specialized Programming Languages 
Hot Swappable Components
Deterministic Networking
This is Boring!  You Mentioned Touchscreens?
Controllers have little or no user interface capability
Pushbuttons and Lamps
Dedicated Interface Terminals (OIT)
PC-Based Interfaces
SCADA
Operator Interface Terminals - What's special about _them_?
Ruggedized Hardware
Water/Dust sealed
Passive Cooling
Class 1,Div II Explosion Proof Ratings
Multiple Interface Ports
No Rotating Storage
Specialized Software
Drivers for multiple devices
Configuration software for making displays easily
Scaling and Ranging
Password Levels
Event Logging
Alarm Handling and Logging
Data Passthrough between Devices
Data Passthrough between Displays
Programming of PLCs through other Display ports
Downsides:
Lessened life expectancy
Shorter time in market
Shorter time for repairs after EOL
The actual hardware under control
Operator Interface Devices
Pushbuttons
Selector Switches
Lights
Numeric Displays
Buzzers and Horns
Voice Annunciators
Sensors
Limit Switches
Metal Sensors
Optical Sensors
Thermocouples and RTDs
Strain Gauges
Float Switches
Level Sensors
Water Detectors / Oil Detectors
Actuators
Pneumatic Cylinders / Hydraulic Cylinders
Relays
Contactors / Motor Starters
Inverters
Servomotors & Drives
Solenoids
Motorized Valves
How are these things programmed?
PLCs
Dedicated IDE application under Windows (some Mac/Linux)
Ladder Language
Instruction Logic
IEC Block Programming
Structured Text Language
Flow Chart / Logic Gate (more common on DCS systems)
Monitoring and Debugging built into the IDE
Simulation often part of IDE
OITs
Dedicated IDE app under Windows, some systems now Browser-based
WYSIWYG visual editor for graphic layouts
Some have simulation capabilities
PC Based SCADA
Combination of Graphic IDE and spreadsheet-like back end
Part Two - DHS ICS Cybersecurity Class, Idaho Falls, ID
What it is
"Hands-on training in discovering who and what is on the network, identifying 
vulnerabilities, learning how those vulnerabilities may be exploited, and learning 
defensive and mitigation strategies for control system networks."
How to attend
https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/Training-Available-Through-ICS-CERT#workshop
https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/Calendar
How to prepare
Reading list
Metasploit/Armitage practice
Firewall Rules
Snort Rules
What to bring
Burner laptop which boots from DVD
Personal laptop which is fully patched
Favorite net-related software / apps
What to expect
Attendees will have a wide variety of experience levels
Demonstration of exploits
Basic training on networking and how exploits work internally
Intro to tools like metasploit and armitage
Chance to attack a test network
Planning and co-ordinating attack or response (red/blue team)
10 hours of non-stop cyberattack
Five good lunches
Lunchtime presentations
CSET (Cyber-Security Evaluation Tool)
https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/Assessments
ICS-CERT (Industrial Control System CyberEmergency 
Response Team)
https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/
and AAL (Advanced Analytic Lab)
https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/About-Industrial-Control-Systems-Cyber-Emergency-Response-Team
Part Three - Securing ICS Networks
History of PLC Security
Stand-alone boxes
System programs in EPROM
Programs on EPROM, Battery RAM.
Programming - specialized hardware
Security - obscurity, physical access control, specialized hardware
Attack surface - basically not a consideration
No password protection
Stand-alone boxes with serial ports
System programs in EPROM
Programs on EEPROM, Battery RAM.
Programming - specialized hardware, then PCs
Security - obscurity, physical access control, specialized hardware,
specialized software, proprietary protocols
Attack surface - disgruntled employees, war diallers
Minimal password protection
Advent of HMI devices, modems
Boxes with vendor-proprietary local networking
System programs in EPROM
Networking requires special hardware, protocols unpublished or only
partially published with proprietary functions.
Programming - PCs via serial, then network
Remote HMI devices, SCADA systems
Security - obscurity, physical access control, specialized software,
proprietary protocols
Attack surface - disgruntled employees, corporate espionage
Password protection available, rarely used, backdoors exist or passwords are sent 
in clear text from PLC, tend to be limited length and limited character set 
(numeric or hex or capital alphanumeric)
(PLC passwords are generally considered a defense against illegal copying of 
Intellectual Property, rather than against intrusion by third-party actors.  
Manufacturers of PLCs want the ability to override the passwords in case of a 
system failure which requires the program be read back from the PLC, and 
honestly, so do most end-users.)
Boxes with third-party defined open local networking
System programs in battery RAM or Flash
Programming - PCs via serial, proprietary network (rarely over open)
Security - obscurity, physical access control, specialized software,
unpublished extensions to networking, passwords
Attack surface - disgruntled employees, corporate espionage, state actors
Password protection available, rarely used, backdoors exist or passwords are sent 
in clear text from PLC, tend to be limited length and limited character set 
(numeric or hex or capital alphanumeric)
Third party networks rarely well supported or completly supported
Bridges to third-party SCADA systems
Boxes with ethernet connectivity
System programs in battery RAM or Flash
Programming - PCs via serial, proprietary net, ethernet
Security - obscurity, specialized software, unpublished extentions to
proprietary networks, passwords, external firewalls
Attack surface - significant fraction of the population
Password protection available, rarely used, backdoors exist or passwords are sent 
in clear text from PLC, tend to be limited length and limited character set 
(numeric or hex or capital alphanumeric) - with net connection, brute forceable
(PLCs allow repeated guessing attempts with no limits on tries, no time delays 
between tries.  AutoHotKey can be used to type passwords into GUIs, word lists 
can be used on network attacks.)
Ethernet support, like third party support, is incomplete, insecure, 
and allows dangerous access in the name of ease of use.
Remote access via Ethernet for all monitoring and programming.
History of penetration software and Crackers/Attackers
Stand-alone boxes, basically nobody.
Once serial ports and modems arrive, war-diallers show up, but obscure 
hardware and comms protocols keep them at bay.
PLC networking brings some corporate espionage possibilities, but that still
requires some kind of physical access.  Modem access now more dangerous
since corporate money can buy the specialized software required to 
access the control systems.
Third party networks result in PLC modules which poorly implement various
protocols, leaving opportunity to pull out data or possibly 
take down a control process - but rarely allow access to PLC program
or System Program Flash memory.
Ethernet connectivity brings all the problems of poorly implemented third party
networks with the ability to put a PLC system directly on the net, or
on the net behind a failed or DMZ'ed firewall, or on a corporate net
where Crackers have already gained entry.
Penetration software is now easier to use than Gmail.
Published vulnerabilities show up as plug-in modules in automatic updates 
multiple times per day.  
No manufactured device can be considered "Obscure" at this point - it will be
automatically detected, and any known vulnerability will be available
as a click-button exploit.
Many corporations' IT departments consider their internal corporate networks
to be compromised 100% of the time - they have conceded the battle, and
direct their users to assume that anything sent unencrypted over the 
internal network will be visible to competing firms and foreign 
governments.  This is of course true for any PLC-related traffic that
hits the corporate network.
Trade-offs - Security, reliability <-> Ease of implementation, speed, 
expandability, functionality
(Note that "reliability" gets _worse_ with > ease, speed, expandability)
Systems which go together very easily tend to fail very easily, whereas
  systems which take some fussing at to get working tend to stay 
  working for long periods of time.  (Ethernet switch failures,
  switch configuration, inferior cabling quality, cheap connectors...) 
So how do we combat this?
At The Implementation Level
Pick the low-hanging fruit.  Many PLCs have "Run\Remote/Program" switches,
  don't leave them in "Remote" - that stops remote attackers from reprogramming
  the PLC without your knowledge.
Don't leave tools around - If you must have a general purpose PC around, there 
  is rarely justification for having PLC programming software on an operator's
  workstation.
Supply a separate general-purpose workstation to keep operators from using 
  controls system PCs "just to check my email real quick."
Use passwords - feel free to write them inside the panels so that in future,
  the system can be maintained in an emergency, but if nothing else it may
  slow down an intruder or cause their traffic to be detected.
Don't leave the digital keys in the lock - make sure that passwords aren't
  left sitting in a text file, or listed in the software.  Don't leave the 
  commented software sitting on the workstation.  It's better to put everything
  (drawings, software, tools) on a USB stick that's duct-taped to the inside of 
  the cabinet (threat vector becomes the few people with physical access) than 
  to leave a password in a file on a workstation. 
Keep PLC-PLC comms off corporate networks whenever possible.  Corporate traffic
  can cause delays in PLC-PLC comms and standard maintenance on corporate
  IT hardware can cause PLC comms to malfunction with no apparent reason, and
  can make it difficult to get systems back up and running when something in 
  a faraway closet has been shut off.
Talk to the site's IT department - have them assign an IP range you will use,
  ask them to set up their intrusion detection to alert on any traffic within
  that range.  (Protects against someone adding a cable between PLC network
  and Corporate network.)
Label all communications cables, and make a map of what ports are in use on 
  ethernet switches in your panels.  (Make it easy to later identify if any
  cables have been added to the system.)
Determine minimum functionality needed for any data exchange.
Serial lines are more secure than proprietary networks
Proprietary networks are more secure than ethernet connectivity
Air-gapped ethernet is more secure than ethernet to the corporate net
Nothing can be sent back up a transmit-only serial pair
Use firewalls for third-party protocols.
Beware of default settings - most often, the default settings for a card are
  the most open and accessible, leave the most ports open and the most 
  protocols available,
Lock down transmissions when that function is available (i.e. if a Modbus card
  has an "all access" mode and a "just these pre-defined points" mode, use the
  pre-defined points setting.  (Can help with deflecting problems caused by 
  leftover master communications configurations on Modbus networks as well.)
Beware of "multiple function" devices - ethernet ports which serve Modbus, 
but also can be used as programming ports, etc. - also watch out for cards
which ignore port assignments (makes them harder to firewall.)
Use dedicated devices for user interface rather than general purpose computers.
Operator Interface Terminals have become much more capable, but don't have the 
general reprogrammability and succeptibility to viruses that PCs have.
Check vulnerability databases for controls hardware (you'll be frightened)
PLC interface cards have come down in price enough that it pays to add a 
separate one specifically for external device access, and funnel all interface
traffic through that single PLC - it may make sense to make a separate "comms
interface" PLC on a larger network, which does nothing but compile data from
the other PLCs and format it for external pickup.
For systems which require occasional connection to the net (for remote service,
updates, etc.) consider adding a rail-mount ethernet switch which is powered 
by a PLC output.  That output is only triggered by a password-protected 
button on the operator interface, and powers up the switch for a preset amount
of time (say, 2 hours.)  This cuts down the temporal attack surface from 
24/7/365 to a couple of hours every few months - just tremendously worth it.
At The Specification Level
Insist that you receive commented source code and the development tools for all
PLC systems that you purchase.
Insist that you have receive detailed documentation about all network communications 
implemented between devices.
Insist that the networking system used is the absolute minimum needed to
accomplish the required tasks. 
(Federal Reserve Bank - No Ethernet allowed between PLC panels.)
Ask for copies of the vulnerability assesments for all networking hardware supplied.
Ask vendors to supply detailed security plans for the systems they will supply.
Ask vendors to discuss their security plans for their own internal systems.  
(We repaired the Y2K issue because everybody got in everybody else's face about it, and 
everyone fixed things because they had to in order to get contracts, not just because it was a 
good idea.  If you have a choice between vendors, maybe you want the one who has spent 
some time making sure that your new system isn't arriving pre-hacked.)
Security Enhancement for Existing Systems
Discovery
Find out what's in your building
Find out what it's connected to, and if it's supposed to be connected
Check with suppliers and hardware vendors for updates.
Budgeting
How much time and money can you commit to these upgrades?
After those two disappointments – Planning
Assess attack surface
Estimate threat level and repercussions
Determine mitigation pathway
Firewalls
Monitoring
Software verification
Limiting connections
One-way communications
Implementation
One change at a time, check full functionality after changes.
Penetration Testing
Continued Monitoring
Thank you for your time and attention!
Phil Salkie
Jenariah Industrial Automation
446 Ridge Road, Suite 10
Greenbelt, MD  20770
phil@jenariah.com
+1-732-620-1900
Appendix A
DHS ICS CyberSecurity Class – Syllabus
https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/Training-Available-Through-ICS-CERT#workshop
Monday: 8-5 
Morning DHS Overview, ICS 301 
ICS Threats and Risks, Exploit Demonstration 
Lunch CSET Presentation 
Afternoon Other Attack Scenarios, Hands-on Network Discovery, Basic Networking Topics 
Passive Discovery, Host Discovery, Active Discovery, Nmap 
Optional 5-6 Network Tools Refresher 
Tuesday: 8-5 
Morning Active Discovery, Vulnerability Scanner, Discovery Review 
Metasploit, Terminology - Vulnerability and Exploits 
Basic Exploitation Process, Remote Exploits 
Lunch ICS-CERT Presentation 
Afternoon Metasploit Continued, Client Side Exploits, Payloads, Meterpreter Shell 
Separate into Red and Blue Teams, Initial Briefings 
Red Team/Blue Team Strategy Meetings 
Optional 5-6: Red Team/Blue Team Strategy Meetings 
Wednesday: 8-5 
Morning Network Exploitation, Basic Web Hacking , Man-in-the-Middle,
Passwords and Hashes, Network Defense 
Lunch AAL Presentation 
Afternoon Logging and Log Analysis, Network Architecture, Network Flow Data 
Red Team/Blue Team Strategy Meetings 
Optional 5-6: Red Team/Blue Team Strategy Meetings 
Thursday: 7-5 
Morning Red Team/Blue Team Exercise 
Lunch Blue Team All Hands Meeting 
Afternoon Red Team/Blue Team Exercise 
Friday: 8-1 
Morning Exercise Debrief 
Lunch Site Tour - open access to Blue Team, White Team, Red Team areas
APPENDIX B
Industrial Control System Cybersecurity (301) Workshop
Reading Materials
Recommended Reading *
Prior to attending the Process Control Security Training, and to increase your subject-specific 
knowledge, it is recommended that some or all of the following references are reviewed and studied.
Online training provided by DHS ICS-CERT
• http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/Training-Available-Through-ICS-CERT
Basic Linux (the hands-on exercises are done in a Linux environment):
• http://www.linux-tutorial.info/
• http://www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/Teaching/Unix/
Metasploit users’ guide: https://community.rapid7.com/docs/DOC-1751 
• Mastering the Framework:  http://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/
• Additional information  http://framework.metasploit.com/about/
An introduction/overview of common SCADA communications, e.g.:
• http://www.dcbnet.com/notes/0108worldofwaterpaper.html
• http://www.dnp.org/pages/aboutdefault.aspx
• http://www.isa.org/journals/intech/TP04ISA048.pdf
Intrusion Detection:
• http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1577
• http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1852
• http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/systems/articles/snort-base-jsp-138895.html
• http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/systems/articles/intrusion-detection-jsp-140939.html
An explanation of SQL injection methods, e.g.:
• http://www.unixwiz.net/techtips/sql-injection.html
• http://www.securiteam.com/securityreviews/5DP0N1P76E.html
HACKING: Art of Exploitation by Jon Erickson
• http://www.amazon.com/Hacking-Art-Exploitation-Jon-Erickson/dp/1593270070
Secure Coding in C and C++ by Robert Seacord
• http://www.informit.com/store/product.aspx?isbn=0321335724
DHS Catalog of Control System Security: Recommendations for Standards Developers:
• https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CatalogofRecommendationsVer7.pdf
NIST Special Publication SP 800-82 Guide to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and
Industrial Control Systems Security
• http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-82/SP800-82-final.pdf
SANS ICS Security Summit interview (video)
• http://www.controleng.com/index.php?id=7229
For those with little or no ICS experience, these Wikipedia articles provide a brief introduction to the 
concepts and history of control systems that will be helpful to know for class.
• http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ICS
• http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SCADA
• http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smart_grid
• http://nostarch.com/xboxfree - While this has nothing to do with control systems, it 
provides a great introduction to the concepts and techniques taught in this class to 
pen test embedded electronic hardware in ICS ,eld/-oor devices.
• http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistir/ir7628/nistir-7628_vol3.pdf - Chapter 7 of the 
NIST Interagency Report 7628, titled Bottom-up Security Analysis of the Smart Grid, 
provides an overview of the challenges faced in Smart Grid and energy sector 
systems.
The OWASP Cheat Sheet Series
• https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cheat_Sheets
Center for Internet Security
• http://www.cisecurity.org/ 
SANS
• http://www.sans.org
• “Twenty Critical Controls for Effective Cyber Defense” http://www.sans.org/critical-security-
controls/cag4-1.pdf
• “Top Cyber Security Risks” http://sans.org/top-cyber-security-risks/
Australian Defense Signals Directorate (http://www.asd.gov.au/)
• “Top 35 Mitigation Strategies” http://www.dsd.gov.au/infosec/top35mitigationstrategies.htm
• Mandatory Top 4 Strategies to Mitigate Targeted Cyber Intrusions 
http://www.dsd.gov.au/infosec/top-mitigations/top-4-strategies-explained.htm 
For more information on Snorby, Snort, and other Network System Monitoring (NSM) tools, see “The 
Practice of Network Security Monitoring: Understanding Incident Detection and Response, 
Understanding Incident Detection and Response” by Richard Bejtlich July 2013, 376 pp. ISBN: 978-1-
59327-509-9
* The links provided here are for your convenience; in no way does this list imply endorsement by the 
DHS of the companies or websites listed.
